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AN IMPLIED RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION UNDER RULE
10b-5: AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF ATTAINING THE GOALS
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
MARYELLEN P. DOOLEY
INTRODUCTION

Suppose that you are an attorney whose firm has participated in an
initial public offering. This offering has sparked a law suit against your
firm under federal anti-fraud securities laws.' You are amazed to find
that your firm is the sole defendant in the case. The investors have not
sued the accountants, underwriters, broker/dealers, or the corporation's
officers involved in the offering. If your firm loses the suit, is it fair that it
will have to pay the entire amount of damages set at trial even though it
has been but one of many players involved in the deal?
If your firm does not have a right to institute an action for contribution against the other joint tortfeasors, this inequitable result may occur.
Rather than risk having to pay huge damages, your firm may choose to
settle the case, even if it is somewhat confident that it could prevail at
trial. Additionally, the settlement amount may be increased because the
plaintiff is in a bully's position.
This lopsided outcome certainly seems at odds with our sense of fairness and our legal system's focus on just compensation and allocation of
liability. Indeed, it raises the question of whether securities fraud defendants should have the right to be compensated for any amount they are
required to pay over and above their fair share of damages.
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to hear this
issue in Musick, Peeler & Garrettv. Employers Insurance of Wausau.' In
this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether federal courts may imply a private right of contribution in actions under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and, more specifically, under Rule lOb-5
of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The issue of contribution arises often in Rule lOb-5 actions because,
generally, there numerous parties involved in securities deals who may
have perpetrated a fraud on investors. The list of potentially liable parties includes accountants, attorneys, underwriters, brokers, dealers, and
corporate officials.
The traditional view has been that federal courts may imply a right of
contribution in Rule lOb-5 actions.3 Recently, however, a minority view
1. See eg., The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-11 (1988); SEC
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
2. 113 S. Ct. 54 (1992) (granting certiorari to Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick,
Peeler & Garrett, 954 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1992)).
3. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 954 F.2d 575 (9th
Cir. 1992); Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1987); Sirota v. Solitron
Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 578 (2d Cir. 1982); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640
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has emerged proposing that courts may not imply such a right.4 The
Eighth Circuit, in adopting the minority view, admitted it was going
against "the great weight of federal court authority" in concluding that
federal courts have incorrectly "presumed they were authorized to expand the federal courts' power."5
This Note will address the question presented to the Supreme Court in
Musick regarding whether federal courts should imply a right of contribution in Rule lOb-5 actions. Specifically, this Note will examine the
arguments on both sides of this issue, outline the likely ramifications of a
decision either way, and conclude that the Supreme Court should uphold
a right of contribution for defendants in Rule lOb-5 actions.
Part I of this Note will present the background of the right of contribution and Rule lOb-5. First, it will examine the purpose, history and
policy of actions for contribution. Second, it will examine the purpose
and history of both the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5.
Part II will discuss the opposing views regarding contribution in Rule
lOb-5 actions. Part III will focus on the possible effects of the Supreme
Court's decision in Musick. Specifically, Part III will recommend that
the Supreme Court adopt the view that, in an action under Rule lOb-5,
federal courts should imply a right of contribution for alleged violators of
the Rule. Finally, this Note will conclude that implying a right of contribution in Rule lOb-5 actions reflects the intent of Congress and serves to
allocate damages equitably.

I.

BACKGROUND

A.

Contribution

Civil defendants whom courts find liable for money damages can use
contribution, a type of tort action, to recover from joint tortfeasors. The
equitable doctrine of contribution provides that where two or more persons are liable for the same injury, any one person who pays more than
his or her proportionate share has a right of contribution against the
other liable persons. 6 Specifically, it distributes plaintiff's damages
among the joint tortfeasors by requiring each to contribute to the total
F.2d 534, 556-59 (5th Cir. 1981); Seiler v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 102 F.R.D. 880, 885-86
(D.N.J. 1984); In re Nat'l Student Mktg. Litig., 517 F. Supp. 1345, 1347-49 (D.D.C.
1981); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 957-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), afl'd,442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971); deHaas v. Empire
Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (D. Colo. 1968), afld,435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir.
1970). See generally, TBG, Inc. v. Bendis, 811 F. Supp. 596 (D. Kan. 1992) (citing cases
approving this traditional allowance of contribution under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
4. See Chutich v. Touche Ross & Co., 960 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 1992); King v.
Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275, 1281 (7th Cir. 1989) (abandoning its earlier analysis in Heizer
Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979), which allowed for contribution in securities
cases).

5. Chutich, 960 F.2d at 722.
6. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A (1979).
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damages in proportion to his or her culpability.' Contribution, which
involves proportionate sharing of liability, is distinguishable from indemnity, which is a complete shift of all responsibility from one party to
another.
The main purpose of contribution is to "assure fairness in the allocation of liability." 9 When several parties combine to cause an injury, contribution prevents the unjust enrichment of some wrongdoers at the
expense of other wrongdoers.'° Where a party establishes that it has paid
its fair share relative to other parties to the suit, but more than its fair
share relative to the universe of all joint tortfeasors, then that party has
an action for contribution. 1"
Historically, contribution developed along with the general law of
torts. As early as 1799 in England, contribution was not permitted because the law's primary objective was to discourage tortious behavior
with punitive measures.' 2 Accordingly, courts were not concerned with
a wrongdoer's disproportionate share of responsibility for damages.1 3
American
common law also generally prohibited contribution in tort
14
actions.

As the goal of tort law changed from punishment of wrongdoers to
compensation of victims, courts became more concerned with compensating a wrongdoer who had paid more than his proportionate share of
damages.' Accordingly, nineteenth century courts in the United States
began allowing contribution, although a clear distinction was drawn between intentional and negligent tortfeasors' rights to the action. A right
of contribution was recognized for negligent tortfeasors because courts
were predominantly concerned with compensating the victim, rather
than meting out punishment to the negligent wrongdoer.' 6 Later decisions blurred the distinction and allowed intentional, as well as negligent,
tortfeasors a right of contribution. 7 This was a particularly important
development for the securities fraud area because violations of securities
7. See I James A. Dooley, Modem Tort Law § 26.01 (1977).
8. See William Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 50, at 307 (4th ed. 1971).
9. Department of Economic Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 747 F. Supp. 922, 935
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); accord Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 111
(1974).
10. See Robert A. Leflar, Contributionand Indemnity Between Torifeasors,81 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 130, 136-37 (1932).
11. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 954 F.2d 575, 578
(9th Cir. 1992). Actions for contribution may be brought in third party actions or in
separate actions. See id at 577. Separate actions are allowed because the right of contribution creates a substantive right, and is not merely procedural in nature. See id.
12. See Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
13. See Leflar, supra note 10, at 134.
14. See Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R., 196 U.S. 217, 228 (1905).
15. See Note, Toward a Workable Rule of Contribution in the Federal Courts, 65
Colum. L. Rev. 123, 124 (1965).
16. See Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns. Ch. 104, 107 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
17. See Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 957 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), afld, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
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regulations involve intentional or reckless, not negligent, acts.' 8
In 1939, the American Law Institute attempted to codify the law of
contribution by proposing a Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act in response to England's Law Reform Act of 1935, which abolished
its rule against contribution actions. Congress did not pass this proposed
Act. 19 An amended Uniform Act was proposed in 1955 and was, again,
rejected. By the 1970s, after years of harsh criticism of the no-contribution rule, most states passed their own contribution-permitting laws.20
Although many of the states have passed versions of the Uniform Act
itself,2 Congress has not passed
the Uniform Contribution Among
22
Tortfeasors Act in any form.
There are three elements necessary to make a viable claim for contribution: first, there must be overlapping liability between or among the
parties;2" second, there must be support in the applicable substantive law
for distribution of liability between or among the parties; 24 and third,
there must be a procedural device for distributing the liability.2 5
The second element, requiring substantive law support for the claim, is
the source of the inquiry into contribution rights in Rule lob-5 actions.
In order to allow defendants to recover in an action for contribution,
courts must find that a substantive right to contribution exists under the
statutory scheme engendering the initial suit. Such a right to contribution may originate in one of two ways: first, through the affirmative creation of the right by Congress in a statute, either expressly or by clear
implication; or second, through the federal courts' power to fashion common law relief.2 6 Courts must first look to the language of the statute to
see if contribution is expressly provided for by Congress. 27 If it is not, as
in the case of Rule lOb-5, then courts must determine if a right to an
action for contribution may be implied.28
If no right to contribution is found to have been implied by Congress,
then courts must decide if their power to fashion common law relief allows them to create a right of contribution in the particular instance.29
18. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (scienter required for
actions under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5).
19. See Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1227 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989).
20. See id. at 1227; see also Contribution And Claim Reduction in Antitrust Litigation,
A.B.A. Sec. of Antitrust Law, 6 & nn.37-39 (1986) (listing 39 states with laws permitting
contribution).
21. See Kaypro, 884 F.2d at 1227.
22. See id.
23. See Shapiro v. Miami Oil Producers, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 234, 239 (D. Mass. 1979).
24. See id.

25. See id.
26. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77,
90-91 (1981); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638 (1981).
27. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 639.
28. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the modified Cort
test.
29. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 638.
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There are limited, narrow areas in which federal courts have the power
to create "federal common law,"'30 even though there is no actual "federal general common law.", 31 The Supreme Court, however, has not
enunciated a complete list of circumstances governed by a federal common law.3 2 Therefore, the concept remains somewhat nebulous.33 There
are two categories of cases in which federal courts have the power to
create a federal common law: first, those cases involving the protection

of "uniquely federal interests"; and second, cases where Congress has
given the courts the power to develop substantive law.3 4 "Uniquely federal interests" include interstate and international disputes implicating
conflicting states' rights, foreign relations or admiralty. 5
Because contribution has evolved from federal common law, its legisla-

tive inclusion in some statutes and implication into others sparks debate
between those who find strong policy reasons in support of contribution
and those who find more policy reasons to exclude it from practice.
1. Arguments Supporting and Criticising Contribution
The controversy surrounding contribution actions can best be analyzed by first examining the policy reasons enunciated for and against
them. Support for contribution has been widespread. One argument articulated in support of contribution actions is that they create a more
equitable outcome by allocating liability among joint tortfeasors according to their individual responsibility for the tort. According to Professor
Prosser,
There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the
entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally...
responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according to the accident
30. See id at 640.
31. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
32. See James S. O'Shaughnessy, JudicialImplication of Contribution Under Section
10(b) of the Securities ExchangeAct: Is the New Branch on the Judicial Oak Threatened
by Strict Statutory Construction?, 16 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 983, 993 n.50 (1982).
33. See id
34. See Chutich v. Touche Ross & Co., 960 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)).
35. See idL at 724. Admiralty is an example of an area in which federal courts have
the power to fashion rules of federal common law because of the uniquely federal interests involved. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 259
(1979). Consequently, the Court upheld a right of contribution in admiralty cases. See
Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974) (shipowner may receive contribution from tortfeasor jointly responsible for injury to longshoreman, based
on ancient admiralty doctrine).
The Court also based this federal common law contribution relief on its history of
allocating damages among tortfeasors in admiralty since the nineteenth century. See
Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 177-78 (1854) (Court adopted
rules of equal division of total damages among parties); Strout v. Foster, 42 U.S. (I How.)
89, 92 (1843) (recognizing equal division of damages rule); see also United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 410-11 (1975) (changing the standard to comparative
fault in response to severe criticism of equal division of damages rule).
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of a successful levy of execution, the existence of liability insurance,
the plaintiff's whim or spite, or the plaintiff's
collusion with the other
36
wrongdoer, while the latter goes scott free.
Secondly, a no-contribution rule may promote collusion between
plaintiffs and tortfeasors who are not being sued, against the interests of
the tortfeasor who is being sued for the entire damage amount. 37 Moreover, such a rule would allow plaintiffs to extract a large settlement from
individual defendants by singling them out and threatening suit. Minor
participants may end up paying plaintiffs simply to avoid suit while other
tortfeasors may pay nothing. Each defendant may settle for more than
his share to avoid the possibility of total liability. Consequently, the
tortfeasors, together, may end up paying more in settlements than the
total injury caused.38
A third argument supporting contribution is that it permits joinder of
all potential defendants and, thereby, creates a larger group from which a
plaintiff can demand compensation. A plaintiff has a greater chance of
full recovery when the number of liable parties increases. 39 Finally, contribution broadens the scope of the deterrent effect of judgments by reducing the likelihood that any tortfeasor will escape liability in any given
tort action. 4°
Critics of contribution claim that it complicates and extends the duration of litigation, thereby wasting judicial time and energy. 4 ' This criticism, however, seems to value judicial expediency above equitable
solutions. Contribution actions facilitate granting full recovery to injured plaintiffs, as well as apportioning liability according to degree of
fault. Congress's goal in enacting the securities laws was to protect investors.42 In light of that goal, equitable solutions seem to be more important than judicial expediency for its own sake.
In addition, critics argue that contribution may discourage settlement
because a settling defendant may still be liable to other defendants in an
36. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 50, at 337-38
(5th ed. 1984).
37. See Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., 374 N.E.2d 437,
442 (Ill. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
38. See Charles 0. Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54
Harv. L. Rev. 1170, 1172 (1941).
39. See Fleming James, Jr., Indemnity, Subrogation, and Contribution and the Efficient Distributionof Accident Losses, 21 NACCA L.J. 360, 361-62 (1958).
40. See O'Shaughnessy, supra note 32, at 989; Note, supra note 15, at 124; see also
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 88 (1981) (right to
contribution among joint tortfeasors "deter[s] all wrongdoers by reducing the likelihood
that any will entirely escape liability"); Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417
U.S. 106 (1974) (explaining the deterrent effect of contribution); Employers Ins. of
Wausau v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 954 F.2d 575, 578 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining the
deterrent effect of contribution).
41. See Ernest M. Jones, Contribution Among Tortfeasors, 11 U. Fla. L. Rev. 175,
216-17 (1958).
42. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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action for contribution. 43 This problem can be eliminated, however, by
barring contribution claims against settling defendants." Many courts
have barred such claims in order to encourage settlement.4 5
Those opposed to contribution further contend that contribution is socially undesirable because insured defendants may shift the burden to
uninsured defendants.' This would concentrate the loss rather than distribute it throughout society through insurance premiums. The reverse
phenomenon happens far less frequently because, generally, when choosing among joint tortfeasors in a civil action, plaintiffs first bring actions
against insured tortfeasors rather than uninsured ones.4 ' Yet, one of the
effects of allowing contribution actions will be that it will encourage
more parties involved in securities transactions to procure insurance to
protect themselves against the increased possibility of being found jointly
liable in any given action, even if they are not made parties by the
plaintiffs.
A final criticism of the right to contribution is that implying a right of
contribution "expands federal judicial power far beyond defining the limits of a fraud victim's implied claim under section 10(b) and invents a
new cause of action."4 This claim undercuts itself. In recognizing the
right to a private action under Rule lOb-5, courts were essentially "inventing" a new cause of action by implying it from the Rule, but this was
permitted because it fulfilled congressional intent.4 9 If courts can discern
that Congress intended a right of contribution in addition to a private
action under Rule lOb-5, then it follows that they are similarly able to
"invent" another cause of action to fulfill that intention.
Courts created private actions under Rule lOb-5 only to fulfill Congress's intent to provide for private actions under the Rule. Similarly,
courts can imply contribution in Rule lOb-5 actions only if doing so follows the intent of Congress and furthers the purpose of the securities
laws.5 0 It is necessary, therefore, to examine the purpose and intent of
Congress in enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
43. See O'Shaughnessy, supra note 32, at 987.
44. See William Bruce Davis, Multiple Defendant Settlement in lob-5: Good Faith
Contribution Bar, 40 Hastings L.J. 1253, 1259 (1989).
45. See e.g., Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27 (2d
Cir. 1976) (partial settlement bars contribution claims when settlement amount is for
"proper share of damages"); Nelson v. Bennett, 662 F. Supp. 1324, 1329 (E.D. Cal. 1987)
(discussing state settlement bar statutes); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Oppenheim,
Appel, Dixon & Co., 631 F. Supp. 1029, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (partial settlement bars
contribution claims subject to state's tort settlement bar statute).
46. See Fleming James, Jr., ContributionAmong Joint Tortfeasor" A PragmaticCriticism, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1156, 1165-67 (1941).
47. See id at 1167.
48. 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1575 (1992).
49. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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B. Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 193451 (the "1934
Act") to protect investors against stock price manipulation by both regulating securities transactions and requiring regular reporting by companies with stock listed on the national securities exchanges.5 2 As the
Supreme Court has recognized, the purpose of the 1934 Act and its com-

panion legislative enactments 53 is " 'to substitute a philosophy of full dis-

closure for the philosophy of caveat emptor . . . in the securities
industry.' ,14
In recognition of the complicated nature of the securities industry,
Congress designed the 1934 Act to be flexible so that it could be applied
to the many varied situations which would inevitably arise in that industry. 55 Congress created some express civil remedies and some express
criminal penalties for perpetrators of fraud upon investors, but recognized that a rigid statutory scheme would not enable it to regulate securities transactions as efficiently as a flexible one would. 6 One example of

the flexibility of the 1934 Act is the broad language of Section 10(b).
Section 10(b) makes it "unlawful ...[t]o use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.., any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary '5or
appropriate in the pub7
lic interest or for the protection of investors."
In a further attempt to enable efficient enforcement of the 1934 Act
through a flexible scheme, Congress created the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "SEC") and gave it broad rulemaking powers.5

Rulemaking power, though, is not lawmaking power. Rather, it is the
"'power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-ll (1988).
52. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934).
53. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb; Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79; Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbbb;
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to b-21. These acts also deal with
securities and are, therefore, referred to as "companions" to the 1934 Act. See Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 & n.15 (1972).
54. Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 151 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
55. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)
("[s]ection 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively"); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
56. See Superintendentof Ins., 404 U.S. at 12 ("[s]ection 10(b) must be read flexibly,
not technically and restrictively"); Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 186. The
sections of the 1934 Act that provide express civil remedies are § 9(e), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78i(a)(2) (1988) (persons liable for manipulation of security prices); § 16(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b) (1988) (profit from purchase and sale of security by director or officer is recoverable); § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1988) (persons liable for misleading statements & persons entitled to recover); and § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988) (joint and several
liability).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
58. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78s, 78u (1988).
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expressed by the statute.' "'I This means that the SEC, in its rulemaking
capacity, is bound to follow congressional intent.
The SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5 pursuant to its rulemaking powers
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act to reflect and implement congressional intent." The Rule was hastily drafted and adopted; consequently,
there is very little legislative history or background to Rule lOb-5 itself.6
Adopted on May 21, 1942, it was drafted in response to a situation in
which the president of a corporation was spreading false rumors that his
company was failing, and then purchasing shares in the company at depressed prices.6 2 At that time, there appeared to be no mechanism
through which the SEC could prohibit this conduct. In order to correct
this gap in the anti-fraud rules, the SEC drafted and approved the Rule
on the same day the SEC Regional Commissioner in Boston reported this
63
activity.

The purpose of Rule lOb-5 was to close the "loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in
their purchase." ' " The language of Rule lOb-5 seems to have been derived from section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act"). 65

The similarity in the language is logical because, in enacting Rule lOb-5,
59. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (quoting Dixon v. United
States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965)).
60. Rule lOb-5 provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
...or (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
61. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 212-13 n.32; Conference on Codification of the
FederalSecurities Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 793, 922 (1967).
62. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 212-13 n.32.
63. See id.
64. Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) (promulgation of Rule lOb-5);
accord Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg., 188 F.2d 783, 787 n.2 (2d Cir. 1951).
65. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 767 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Section 17 provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading,or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q (1988).
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the SEC was trying to apply to both sellers and purchasers the prohibitions of section 17, which apply only to sellers.6 6
C. Implied PrivateActions Under Rule 10b-5
Justice Marshall stated that section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 may be "the
most litigated provisions in the federal securities laws."'6 Rule lOb-5,
however, does not expressly provide for any private remedies. In fact,
there is no evidence that the SEC, in adopting Rule lOb-5, considered the
question of private remedial actions. 68 Consequently, the right to a private cause of action under the Rule has been recognized by way of
implication.
In 1946, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
was the first court to imply a private action into Rule lOb-5. In Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co.,69 the plaintiff charged that the three defendants
conspired and misrepresented the truth to the plaintiffs, causing them to
sell their stock in two corporations for an amount far less than its actual
value.7 ° Although Rule lOb-5 does not expressly provide for private civil
suits, the court held that, because the violation of a statute is a tort, the
maxim ubi jus ibi remidium (where there is a right there is a remedy)
requires the allowance of private actions in order for plaintiffs to recover
for violations of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 7 1 The Kardon court recognized that the general purpose of the 1934 Act is the most directing
factor in determining whether or not a right to a private action can be
implied. Moreover, the mere omission of an express provision for such a
private action does not, itself, negate the general implication of the law.72
The Supreme Court has affirmed the notion set forth in Kardon, stating that actions under Rule lOb-5 are to be implied under the statute.7 a
The Supreme Court has devised a general test to determine whether or
not to imply private causes of action under federal statutes that do not
expressly provide for them. The test emerged from the idea that when a
66. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952) (section
17 and Rule lOb-5 are exactly the same except for the substitution of "any person" (10b5) in the place of "the purchaser" (§ 17) and the addition of "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security" in Rule 1Ob-5).
67. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969).
68. See Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) (includes no mention of contribution); see also Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730 (noting lack of SEC discussion of
contribution in passing Rule IOb-5).
69. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
70. See id. at 513.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 514.
73. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975); Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (expressly acknowledging, for the
first time, that a "private right of action is implied under § 10(b)").
Recently, the Court reaffirmed its position on this issue. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2779-80 (1991) ("[s]uch claims are of
judicial creation, having been implied under the statute for nearly half a century").
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federal statute makes an act illegal but leaves the question of its consequences to judicial determination, the answers are to be derived from the
statute and its federal policy.74 In outlining its test in Cort v. Ash,7 5 the
Supreme Court set out four factors to be used in determining if a private
remedy is implicit in any statute not expressly providing one. First, the
court must determine if the plaintiff is of the class for whose benefit the
statute was enacted. Second, the court must examine any legislative intent, express or implicit, either to deny or to create such a remedy.
Third, the court must decide if the remedy would be consistent with the
overall purpose of the legislative scheme. Finally, the action must not be
one traditionally relegated to the states because, if it is, it would be inappropriate to create it on the basis of federal law. 76
The Supreme Court has modified the Cort test and now relies most
heavily on the congressional intent prong, utilizing the other prongs only
as secondary considerations to determine congressional intent.' The
Supreme Court has used this modified Cort test to determine whether to
imply rights to actions for contribution under various statutes not expressly providing for them. 78 In addition to Rule lOb-5 satisfying the
modified Cort test, the Supreme Court also recognized the practical necessity for implying private actions under Rule lOb-5. The Court stated
that private enforcement of SEC rules may provide "a necessary supplement to Commission action." 79 In J.. Case Co. v. Borak,8 ° the Court
found that the federal courts have a duty to provide remedies to effectuate the congressional purpose of the securities laws. 8' Because the chief
purpose of the securities laws is to protect investors, the availability of
judicial relief8 to
defrauded investors is "certainly implie[d]" to achieve
2
that purpose.
74. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (citing Sola Elec. Co. v.
Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942)) (test came from the Rule 14a-9 (proxy rule)
arena and was later adopted by the Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
75. 422 U.S. at 78.
76. See id
77. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (using
Cort factors only insofar as they give indication of congressional intent); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979) (stating Cori factors do not get equal consideration; congressional intent is of utmost importance); Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 688 & n.9 (1979) (other factors of Cori test are indicia of congressional

intent).

78. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (antitrust statutes); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO,
451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981) (Equal Pay Act and Title VII).
79. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
80. Id.
81. See id. at 433.
82. See id at 432.
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II. ACTIONS FOR CONTRIBUTION UNDER RULE lOb-5
A. Implication of the Right to Contribution
Implied private actions under Rule lOb-5 have been universally accepted by the judiciary.8 3 Implying actions for contribution, however,
creates more complicated questions for courts. In actions under Rule
1Ob-5, defendants may seek to be reimbursed by joint-tortfeasors through
an action for contribution. 84 Because there is no express right to contribution in the statute, courts must decide if they can go one step beyond
the initial implication of a private remedy and imply a right to an action
for contribution under Rule lOb-5.
The general question of implying a right of contribution arises in two
very different contexts. The fundamental cause of the controversy over
this issue is the confusion over these two different contexts. The first
context in which the question of implication of a right of contribution
arises is in cases where a statute provides express remedies but makes no
specific mention of contribution. The second context involves cases
where a statute provides no express remedies at all.
In the first situation-where a federal statute provides an express remedy but does not include a right of contribution in that remedy-courts
generally do not imply such a right over and above the remedy provided
in the relevant statute.8 5 Where Congress has taken the time to design
express remedies and enforcement mechanisms, yet contribution is not
mentioned, there is a presumption that Congress intentionally left out
contribution.8 6 The absence of contribution provisions in the presence of
other specific recovery provisions is thought to demonstrate that Con87
gress never intended to include a right of contribution in those actions.
Rule lOb-5, however, is an example of the second context in which the
question of implying contribution rights arises-where Congress provided no express remedies and the very action in which the question of
contribution arises is, itself, an implied action. The traditional view allowing for contribution in Rule lOb-5 cases is correctly based on the rec83. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639-40
(1981) (no implied right of contribution under Sherman and Clayton Acts which provide
for express remedies but not for contribution); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91-94 & n.24 (1981).
86. See Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 97.
87. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 639.
The only way to imply contribution rights in such a case, where Congress has neither
explicitly or implicitly provided for them, would be through federal common law. The
Supreme Court has noted, however, that "contribution does not implicate 'uniquely federal interests' of the kind that oblige courts to formulate federal common law." Id. at
642. Under the second possible justification for creating federal common law, the Court
found that Congress had not authorized courts to develop substantive law under either of
the two statutory schemes discussed in Texas Indus., id. at 641, and Northwest Airlines,
451 U.S. at 98. The mere authority to construe a statute is very different from the authority to fashion a new remedy which Congress itself did not adopt. See Id. at 97.
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ognition that the Rule provided no express remedies, and that all its
private remedies exist only by way of judicial implication in accordance
with congressional intent."8 Courts, nonetheless, disagree over the analysis to be used in deciding whether to imply a right of contribution in Rule

lOb-5 actions. The crux of this controversy stems from the failure of
some courts to recognize the underlying distinction between the two
types of statutes--express rights and implied rights-and the resulting
failure to apply the correct, corresponding rationale to Rule 10b-5-the
implied rights rule.
In reviewing Rule 10b-5 cases, both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits
mistakenly relied on the Supreme Court's reasoning in two cases 89 arising in the express rights context. Unlike Rule lOb-5, however, the statutes at issue in these other two cases included express provisions for
remedies which neglected to mention contribution and it was, therefore,

presumed that contribution was intentionally left out. 90 In the Seventh

Circuit case, King v. Gibbs,9 investors brought a securities fraud action
against the corporation, its president, controller, and board members.9 2
The controller maintained his innocence and sought to recover, from the
other defendants, the money he expended in defending the suit.93 The

court dismissed the controller's cross claims. 94 The Seventh Circuit affirmed.95 In the Eighth Circuit case, Chutich v. Touche Ross & Co.,96

stockholders brought a class action against Green Tree Acceptance, Inc.
and certain directors and officers charging violations of federal securities
laws. 97 The corporation's chairman of the board brought a third party
complaint seeking contribution from the corporation's president, attor88. See, e.g., Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that an
implied right of contribution exists under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); Sirota v. Solitron
Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 578 (2d Cir. 1982) (permitting contribution even though
§ 10(b) does not expressly provide for it); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d
534, 556-59 (5th Cir. 1981) (permitting contribution); Seiler v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 102
F.R.D. 880, 885 (D.N.J. 1984) (refusing to decline to find an implied action for contribution); In re National Student Mktg. Litig., 517 F. Supp. 1345, 1347-49 (D.D.C. 1981)
(holding that a non-settling § 10(b) defendant has an implied right to assert a crosselaim
for contributon against a settling defendant); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc.,
318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (one defendant who paid plaintiffs the full amount of
judgment, reserving any rights it might have to contribution from other tortfeasors, was
permitted to recover from the two remaining defendants), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809,
815-16 (D. Colo. 1968) (allowing implication of contribution), aff'd in part and vacatedin
part, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
89. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 639 (antitrust statutes); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981) (Equal Pay Act and Title VII).
90. See Chutich v. Touche Ross & Co., 960 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1992) (relying on
Texas Indus. and Northwest Airlines); King v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275 (7th Cir. 1989).

91.
92.
93.
94.

876 F.2d 1275 (7th Cir. 1989).
See id. at 1276.
See id at 1277.
See id at 1276.

95. See id

96. 960 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1992).
97. See id. at 722.

S198

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 61

ney, and accountants. 98 The district court dismissed the action for contribution. 99 The Eighth Circuit affirmed."c

If the Seventh and Eighth Circuits followed their express rights context analysis to its logical conclusion, however, then they would have to
find that no private remedy exists at all under Rule lOb-5 because Con-

gress did not provide for any remedy even though it did so in other provi-

sions of the 1934 Act. 10 ' Such a finding would be unsound, however,
because the right to private remedies under Rule lOb-5 has been well

established by judicial implication.'

2

The Supreme Court's logic in the

express rights cases, where Congress provided express remedies, does not

work in the implied rights cases, where the very cause of action which
engendered the suit for contribution is not expressly written and has,

itself, been created by implication. Therefore, the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits' adoption of this logic in King" 3 and Chutich'° 4 was erroneous.
In analyzing implied rights cases, courts must examine the contribution question in the same manner as they previously examined the Rule
lOb-5 private remedy question.' 0 5 In order to imply a right of contribution under federal statutes, courts must either find the congressional intent to provide for contribution or use their own power to fashion federal
common law relief in that area.' 0 6 There is no express congressional direction on contribution in the language of Rule lOb-5 or in section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act. Therefore, courts must determine, first, if they can infer
congressional intent to provide such a right of contribution in Rule lOb-5
actions. 0 7 If not, then the only possible way to find a right to contribution is through courts' federal common law power.' 0 8
There is evidence of congressional intent to provide for a right of contribution among Rule lOb-5 violators in the other sections of the 1934
Act where private remedies and contribution are expressly provided.' 9
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 724.

101. See 1934 Act §§ 9, 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78r (1988) (providing both civil liability
and contribution); 1934 Act §§ 16, 20, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p, 78t (1988) (providing civil liability but not contribution).
102. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404
U.S. 6, 13 & n.9 (1971); see also supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (discussing
implication of private remedies under Rule lOb-5).
103. King v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275 (7th Cir. 1989).
104. Chutich v. Touche Ross & Co., 960 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1992).
105. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
106. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 94
(1981).
107. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
109. See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (D. Colo. 1968),
afl'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970) (finding

defendant liable under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and pointing out that §§ 9 & 18 of the
1934 Act, which are the sections that expressly provide for private remedies, provide for
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There is also evidence of such intent in the very nature and purpose of
the 1934 Act itself. An examination of the Cort factors illustrates the
limits of inferring such congressional intent.
One of the prongs of the Cort test involves the definition of the class of
intended beneficiaries of a statute.' 0 Critics of contribution under Rule
lOb-5 cite this as a basis for disallowing the action."' Although the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was not drafted primarily to protect those
who violate the law and defraud investors," 2 the fact that certain provisions in the 1934 Act provide for contribution illustrates that Congress
did consider violators within the broader scope of protected beneficiaries
of the Act.
Another Cort factor concerns the overall purpose of the Act, which
was to protect investors.' 3 A right of contribution serves this interest by
deterring a wider group of possible defrauders, and by increasing the
likelihood of full recovery on a judgment.' 14 The legislative history
prong of the Cort test 5 is difficult to apply in Rule lOb-5 cases because
Congress never debated the Rule and enacted it so quickly." 6
The final Cort factor, concerning state authority,1 '" is also inapplicable
because the contribution question under Rule lOb-5 arises from an action
under a federal statute. It does not involve an area traditionally relegated to state authority because it is not an action generated

separately. 118
At least one federal district court found that the fact that federal securities regulations are to be administered in pari materia" 9 encouraged
courts to look to the other provisions of the 1934 Act for guidance on
contribution). Section 18 of the 1934 Act provides that "every person who becomes liable to make payment under this section may recover contribution as in cases of contract
from any person who, if joined in the original suit, would have been liable to make the
same payment." 15 U.S.C. § 78r(b) (1988); see also Amicus Curiae Brief for Securities
Exchange Commission at 9-10, Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler &
Garrett, 954 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 54 (1992) (asserting that Congress intended to include contribution in Rule lOb-5 actions).
110. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
111. See O'Shaughnessy, supra note 32, at 1010 nn.150-53.
112. See id.

113. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
118. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 557 (5th Cir. 1981).
119. In pari materia allows courts to consider a group of statutes together if they have
a common purpose. See William Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction
§ 51.03 (4th ed. 1973 & Supp. 1981).
"[T]he interdependence of the various sections of the securities laws is certainly a relevant factor in any interpretation of [the will of Congress as evidenced by] the language
Congress has chosen." SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969). "Section
10(b) and Rule lob-5 together constitute one of the several broad antifraud provisions
contained in the securities laws." Id.
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congressional intent.1 2 1 Statutes should be applied in parimateria when
it is "reasonable to think that members of the legislature (when considering a statute]... would think
about another statute, and have their im1 21
pressions thereby derived."
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits' views 122 follow the incompatible
maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Under this principle, it is
presumed that the omission of a remedy in a particular section of a statute is deliberate if that remedy appears elsewhere in the statute. 123 Once
again, application of this maxim leads to the conclusion that because
some sections of the 1934 Act provide for express remedies, the sections
that do not so provide, omit them purposely to prohibit all private causes
of action under those sections. This logic leads to the conclusion that
Congress intended to prohibit all private actions under Rule lOb-5. As
mentioned above, the existence of private remedies under Rule 1Ob-5 has
been judicially implied and clearly approved by the Supreme Court.' 24
Therefore, application of this maxim would be erroneous.
Congress never considered the specific question of whether a violator
of Rule lOb-5 has a right of contribution against fellow tortfeasors. Recognition of such a right, however, would further Congress's main objective of protecting investors and discouraging fraud in the securities
markets by broadening the possible range of liable parties in any case.
Compared to a situation without contribution, this would both deter
more potential defrauders and assure a larger
pool from which plaintiffs
125
can recover on judgments for damages.
Thus, there is ample evidence from which to infer Congressional intent
for implying a right of contribution in Rule lOb-5 cases.
Courts, therefore, need not look to the possibility of creating a right to
contribution under federal common law. Nevertheless, a complete
analy26
sis requires examining the federal common law possibilities.
In both Texas Industries,Inc. v. RadcliffMaterials,Inc., 27 and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union,' 28 the Supreme Court
held that federal courts could not create a right of contribution as a matter of federal common law because those particular cases did not fall
1 29
within any of the narrow categories governed by federal common law.
Securities laws, like the statutes examined by the Court in Texas Indus120. See Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
121. Sutherland, supra note 119, § 51.03.
122. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
123. See Sutherland, supra note 119, § 47.23.
124. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
127. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
128. 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
129. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 645 (discussing antitrust provisions); Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 97 (discussing employment discrimination provisions).
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tries and Northwest Airlines, fall outside of the narrow categories where
federal courts have power to fashion common law relief. The securities
laws do not operate in an area of "uniquer] federal concern" which has
been limited to cases implicating the rights or duties of the United States
or the resolution of interstate controversies. 30 Courts have been able to
fashion common law relief in admiralty, where there is constitutional authority for the federal judiciary to create federal common law, and in
labor law, where Congress has both vested jurisdiction in the federal
31
courts and empowered the federal courts to create common law.1
When courts fashion the contours of remedies under a federal statute,
like the 1934 Act, they should not act as common law courts. Rather,
they must act within the strictures of congressional intent as embodied in
the legislative scheme under which the judicially created or defined action arises.13 Courts are within their power to imply a right of contribution in Rule lOb-5 cases.
III.

RAMIFICATIONS OF THE

MUSICK DECISION

The Supreme Court will decide the issue of whether courts may imply
a right of contribution for defendants in Rule lOb-5 actions in the case of
Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance of Wausau. 131
This case arose as a result of a settlement of In re Cousins Securities
Litigation 34 ("Cousins"). Cousins was a class action in which shareholders of the Cousins Corporation charged the corporation, its holding company, corporate officers and directors, and two underwriters with
violating the federal securities laws.'
The shareholders charged that
during an initial public offering in 1983, the defendants omitted material
facts in connection with the sale of stock. This engendered a class action
against Cousins (who is the insured of the plaintiffs in the Musick case),
along with its holding company, certain of its officers and directors, and
its two lead underwriters. 36 The Cousins defendants' attorneys and ac130. See Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 95. The Seventh Circuit held a wider view of
"unique federal interests" in granting a federal common law remedy to ousted members
of a federally created union, but this would still not apply to securities laws because the
interests are still basically private ones. See Barany v. Buller, 640 F.2d 726, 735 (7th Cir.
1982).
131. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, Co., 374 U.S. 16,
20-21 (1963) (holding that federal courts have the power to fashion the rule of law in
admiralty cases); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455-56 (1957)
(finding labor law subject to federal common law).
132. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Implied Contribution Under the Federal Securities
Laws A Reassessment, 1982 Duke L.J. 543, 568.
133. 954 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 54 (1992).
134. No.84-1821-B(IEG).
135. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, No. 89-0705JLI(BTM), 1990 WL 74371, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 1990).
136. See iL
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countants were neither sued nor impleaded.' 37 The case was eventually
settled with the defendants' insurers agreeing to pay plaintiffs
$13,500,000.138 The settlement contained a release from
liability to in139
vestors for the non-party attorneys and accountants.
The insurers of Cousins sought to recover from the attorneys and accountants in Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler, & Garrett. " Musick is an action for contribution based on the assertion that
the attorneys and accountants caused the insureds (Cousins) to make
misrepresentations to investors which led to the class action suit that
settled for $13.5 million. 1 1 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 142 The district court
dismissed the action for failure to state a claim.14 3 Employers Insurance
of Wausau and Federal Insurance Co. appealed this dismissal.'" The
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded,
finding that the plaintiffs had
145
stated a valid claim for contribution.
There will be significant, widespread consequences of the Supreme
Court's decision in this case because there are a myriad of participants in
most securities transactions. The entire securities industry needs to
know what kind of liability to expect for different parties in Rule lOb-5
cases. If a Rule lOb-5 plaintiff chooses to sue only one of the joint
tortfeasors for the entire damage amount, and the Supreme Court holds
that that defendant has no right to an action for contribution against
other joint tortfeasors, then a truly inequitable situation will exist where,
by pure luck or even collusion, some tortfeasors will be severely punished
for securities fraud while others will profit from it. 146
If the Supreme Court holds that Rule lOb-5 defendants do not have a
right to an action for contribution, it will close a long-recognized safety
valve in securities fraud cases which has enabled defendants to present
the entire "story" of the case to courts so that fair allocations of liability
may be designed. There seems to be no logic to a rule which gives plaintiffs the power not only to be compensated, but also to selectively punish.
If the right to contribution in Rule lOb-5 actions is not upheld, securities
transactions will become a higher risk business for the various participants because the amount of their potential liability will increase from
their proportional share of the transaction to the entire damages in a
137. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 954 F.2d 575, 576
(9th Cir. 1992).
138. See Employers Ins. of Wausau, 1990 WL 74371, at *1.
139. See Employers Ins. of Wausau, 954 F.2d at 577.
140. No. 89-0705-JLI(BTM), 1990 WL 74371 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 1990). As insurers,
the plaintiffs are subrogees of their insured's rights and can, therefore, sue in the subrogor's place.
141. See id. at *1.
142. See id. at *2.
143. See id. at *5.
144. See Employers Ins. of Wausau, 954 F.2d at 576.
145. See id. at 581.
146. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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Rule lOb-5 suit. Consequently, the cost of doing securities work will increase as firms must insure themselves to a greater degree. Without a
right to contribution in Rule lOb-5 actions, disreputable firms will be
more likely to commit fraud upon investors because it will be less likely
that they will be brought into any subsequent Rule lOb-5 action. 4 7
If the Supreme Court decides against a right of contribution, legislative
lobbying to reverse the decision would likely be heavy.14 8 Legislative
proposals to expressly allow contribution in Rule lOb-5 actions have been
floated on Capitol Hill over the years, but were largely ignored as unnecessary because courts implied actions for contribution virtually without
exception.1 49 A Supreme Court decision against this traditional implication of contribution rights would likely spark lobbying from investor protection advocates who dominate congressional securities committees.'" 0
The Supreme Court should uphold the right to contribution in Rule
lOb-5 cases because contribution actions assure a more equitable outcome both at trial or in settlement. If actions for contribution are
brought by the party originally sued under Rule lOb-5, especially if
brought as third party actions, discovery will yield more information
about what actually transpired and a more equitable outcome will result
at trial or in settlement.
The purpose of the private cause of action under Rule lOb-5 is to compensate the victims of fraud, not to penalize some defrauders and reward
others. Criminal sanctions serve to punish. Conversely, courts in civil
cases should seek outcomes, be they settlements or judgments, that serve
to allocate damages fairly according to relative culpabilities.111 If contribution actions are not allowed, some defrauders will be penalized by the
amount of damages they are required to pay, while other wrongdoers will
benefit by paying nothing." 2
Having a larger group of wrongdoers in the pool responsible for damages will increase the likelihood of full compensation.' 5 3 Without contribution actions, a plaintiff may win a large judgment against a party who
is unable to pay the entire amount. If, on the other hand, that responsible party can bring an action for contribution, it may be able to recover
the amount it is unable to pay alone, and then pay the entire damage
amount to the plaintiff who was defrauded.
Another important consideration is deterrence. The availability of
contribution actions serves to deter more potential defrauders because,
instead of there being a likelihood that only one of every group of four or
147. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
148. See High Court Case Could Expand ProfessionalLiability In Securities Fraud,
Corp. Fin. Wk., Oct. 19, 1992, at 1.
149. See id.
150. See iL
151. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.

S204

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

five parties involved in defrauding investors will be sued, the likelihood
becomes that all of the defrauders will be sued.'" 4 If contribution is allowed, the deterrent effect is likely to be felt by all potentially liable par55
ties, rather than just those parties that plaintiffs are most apt to sue.1
The accounting industry is expected to lobby against such a right of action because "[a]ccountants would have the potential to get sued under
15 6
yet another theory of law."'
The possibility of being sued in an action for contribution will discourage non-party wrongdoers from colluding with the plaintiff in an effort to
railroad another tortfeasor.' 5 7 Plaintiffs would no longer be able to
threaten one wrongdoer with total liability and extract a larger settlement than that party's proportionate share of culpability. This result
would, therefore, be more equitable.'5 8 Without rights to contribution,
"securities fraud plaintiffs and their counsel would have the unfettered
discretion to select which actors, among all of those potentially liable
under Rule lOb-5, are called to account for their conduct."'5 9
Although federal courts do not have federal common law power to
create a right of contribution in actions under Rule 10b-5,1' they do
have the power to imply such a right based on legislative intent. ' 6' Rule
lOb-5 does not have a long, thoroughly debated history from which
courts can glean a clear expression of legislative intent.' 62 The general
purpose of the 1934 Act, however, the provision for contribution actions
elsewhere in the Act, the increased deterrent effect and the fairness of the
outcome,16 all indicate that a right of contribution serves to promote the
intent of Congress in enacting the 1934 Act and the intent of the SEC in
promulgating Rule lOb-5. 1 "6
Although the Supreme Court generally is not inclined to decide a case
based on legal theory rather than on express provisions of securities laws,
the right of contribution in securities fraud cases has been so commonly
upheld in the lower courts 165 that the Court may be swayed away from
this natural inclination. Additionally, equity compels the Court to imply
154. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
155. See Nelson v. Bennett, 662 F. Supp. 1324, 1328 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
156. High Court Case Could Expand Professional Liability in Securities Fraud, Corp.
Financing Wk., Oct. 19, 1992, at 1.
157. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
159. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Securities Industry Association at 1, Musick, Peeler
& Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 54, grantingcert. in 954 F.2d 575 (9th
Cir. 1992).
160. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 109, 125, and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 40, 109, 125, and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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the right of contribution. 166 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has followed a "cautionary" trend in recent years, which would appear to sway

the decision away from creating a right to contribution. The history of
implied contribution in securities fraud areas, however, and the Court's

approach to congressional intent in the 1991 statutes of limitations decision in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson' 6 -that
Congress, had it considered the issue of a statute of limitations when
enacting the 1934 Act, would have included an express provision for one
in the Act-will likely lead the Court to find that had Congress considered the issue of implied contribution under the 1934 Act, it would have
expressly provided for it.168
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court must recognize the difference between statutes expressly providing private remedies but not including contribution, and
statutes, like Rule lOb-5, providing no express remedies at all, where the
very private action engendering the contribution action was itself implied
by the judiciary. The Court will have an opportunity to do so this term
in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance of Wausau.
The traditional allowance of contribution actions in Rule lOb-5 cases
must continue in order to further the goals of Congress and to ensure
equitable resolutions of securities fraud cases for plaintiffs and defendants
alike.
166. See High Court Case Could Expand Professional Liability in Securities Fraud,
Corp. Financing Wk., Oct. 19, 1992, at 1.
167. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991) (holding that securities fraud claim was time barred because the proper statute of limitations for actions under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, which do
not expressly provide their own, was the one provided elsewhere in analagous provisions
of the 1934 Act).
168. See Court Will Uphold Contribution Right In Securities Suits Attorney Predicts,
24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 1744-45 (1992).

